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Abstract: During the past few years a lot of PKI (Public Key Infrastructures) 
infrastructures have been proposed for healthcare networks in order to ensure secure 
communication services and exchange of data among healthcare professionals. 
However, there is a plethora of challenges in these healthcare PKI infrastructures. 
Especially, there are a lot of challenges for PKI infrastructures deployed over large-
scale healthcare networks. In this paper, we propose a PKI infrastructure to ensure 
security in a large-scale Internet-based healthcare network connecting a wide 
spectrum of healthcare units geographically distributed within a wide region. 
Furthermore, the proposed PKI infrastructure facilitates the trust issues that arise in a 
large-scale healthcare network including multi-domain PKI infrastructures. 
 







Nowadays, the growing need for high quality healthcare provision and the increasing 
mobility of citizens have led to the realization of large – scale healthcare networks 
interconnecting many different stakeholders (e.g. hospitals, clinics, pharmacies) of the 
healthcare sector. The main goal of large – scale healthcare networks is to enhance the 
provision of healthcare services to the citizens in a more efficient way. They provide 
higher quality of emergency care, improve the efficiency of emergency healthcare 
units and enhance patient safety. 
A large – scale healthcare network can be seen as an amalgam of 
heterogeneous information systems, facilitating the exchange of healthcare 
information effectively across healthcare institutions geographically distributed within 
a wide region. Moreover, several services such as email and video conference are 
supported for assisting the efficient and productive collaboration of remote healthcare 
units. 
Therefore, healthcare professionals located in different healthcare units are 
able to collaborate, share opinions and expertise with their peers to provide care to 
patients in a more proficient way. Additionally, they are allowed to access 
information resources, such as clinical data and administrative information, stored in 
different healthcare units from any place and any time. Furthermore, this 
infrastructure supports telemedicine services to patients that prefer to stay at their own 
home with minimum intervention from healthcare professionals instead of being 
hospitalized [2, 5, 14]. 
Modern large – scale healthcare networks are based on Internet technology, 
since it provides an attractive infrastructure for efficient and cost - effective 
communication as well as data sharing among doctors, staff members and healthcare 
units. However, these benefits come with a noticeably great factor of risk as Internet 
technology has not been designed to guarantee security. Moreover, the fact that 
patient information is extremely sensitive and critical information introduces many 
serious security concerns which should be handled appropriately at all possible levels. 
Hence, when designing the security of large scale Internet-based healthcare networks, 
it is essential to define the security requirements that should be fulfilled. 
Authentication, authorization, data integrity and data confidentiality are the most 
important security requirements that should be satisfied in large-scale healthcare 
networks. The PKI technology has been widely accepted as the best solution to satisfy 
these requirements for data exchange over insecure networks such as the Internet. The 
PKI technology enables the deployment of PKI infrastructures that issue, revoke and 
manage digital signatures and public key certificates in order to replace handwritten 
signatures in government services, commerce, and legal proceedings. Digital 
signatures and public key certificates allow remote parties, who have no previous 
relationship, to reliably authenticate each other and communicate in a secure way. 
Moreover, authorization is achieved due to the use of the public key certificates. 
Furthermore, digital signatures are used to ensure the integrity of the exchanged data. 
In addition, the uniqueness of the digital signature provides non-repudiation. Finally, 
the PKI technology enables encryption of the transferred messages in order to provide 
confidentiality [9, 11]. However, the adoption of PKI solutions in large-scale 
healthcare networks is moving slowly because of trust concerns that arise among the 
participating parties.  
First of all, large-scale healthcare networks consist of many different 
interconnected PKI trust domains, since each participating healthcare unit comprise a 
different PKI trust domain. Additionally, there are not trust management mechanisms 
to deal with multiple interconnected PKI trust domains appropriately. Consequently, 
PKI trust development in large-scale healthcare networks is of utmost importance in 
order to ensure secure communication and exchange of data [5, 10, 13]. 
In this paper, we propose a PKI-based security infrastructure to provide 
security in a large-scale Internet-based healthcare network connecting hospitals, 
clinics, primary care units, pre-hospital health emergency care, homecare units and 
pharmacies dispersed over a wide area. Additionally, at the same time the proposed 
infrastructure intends to provide scalability, flexibility and reduced administration 
costs, especially when the number of participating healthcare stakeholders increases. 
Furthermore, the proposed PKI infrastructure facilitates the trust issues that arise in a 
large-scale healthcare network including multi-domain PKI infrastructures. 
Following the introduction this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we 
briefly present some related work of PKI infrastructures for healthcare networks to 
ensure secure communication services and exchange of data among the participating 
parties. In Section 3, we discuss the main open issues associated with the efficient 
adoption of PKI technology in large-scale healthcare networks. In Section 4, we 
describe the proposed PKI Infrastructure. Furthermore, the proposed PKI Trust Model 
and the main components of the proposed PKI Infrastructure are presented. In Section 
5, the description of the Certificate Evaluation Process is given. Finally, Section 6 




2. Related Work 
 
During the past few years a lot of effort has been invested in research and 
development of PKI infrastructures for healthcare networks in order to ensure secure 
communication services and exchange of data among the participating parties. Some 
related work regarding the current efforts follows. 
In [5], a PKI-based e-Health authentication architecture is proposed to 
authenticate healthcare professionals accessing the RTS (Rede Telemática da Saúde), 
a regional platform for sharing clinical data among a set of affiliated health 
institutions over a dedicated national health network. The proposed PKI makes use of 
unpublished and short-lived certificates as well as cross-certification agreements 
between the RTS and e-Health institutions to authenticate the healthcare professionals 
when they access the RTS. The certificates are stored on smart cards and they are also 
used for professionals’ authorization as they incorporate roles of the professionals at 
their home institution. Furthermore, trust agreements between the e-Health institutions 
and the RTS take place in order to make the certificates recognized by the RTS.  
In [3], the authors present the PKI and the security architecture for a system 
that gives opticians Internet access from their high street shops to patient data stored 
in a hospital Diabetes Information System (DIS), using a standard Web browser. The 
authors show that in a well-designed system the underlying PKI is virtually invisible 
to the users, and its security is taken for granted in a transparent manner. However, 
they state that in complex information systems such as their proposed PKI, failure of 
just one component or administrative procedure can lead to catastrophic effects on the 
availability of the entire system. 
Additionally, in [8] the authors propose the use of Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI), Attribute Certificates (ACs) and public key enabled protocols such as TLS in 
order to provide the appropriate framework to support security services (i.e. 
authentication, authorization and confidentiality) in mobile online healthcare 
networks. In other words, this paper proposes a framework which integrates ACs and 
the TLS protocol in order to support mobile e-health transactions and sustain high 
level of data confidentiality to the involved entities. Furthermore, the feasibility of the 
proposed framework is evaluated through extensive experimentation. 
In [7], the authors present a hybrid public key infrastructure solution to 
comply with the HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) 
privacy and security regulations in systems supporting Internet-enabled healthcare 
applications. The proposed schema is contact based instead of adopting conventional 
session based cryptographic key management. The presented public key infrastructure 
can be constructed from existing cryptographic technologies where various relevant 
security standards, tools and products are available. 
In addition, there are many national healthcare PKI systems applied over 
national health data networks in many countries such as UK and Australia [4]. The 
major objective of such networks is to provide an integrated environment for efficient 
delivery of healthcare services within a country.  
In [15], it is discussed that Australian government has been exploring how 
digital certificates issued by a national PKI can act as electronic credentials for a 
number of different types of professionals. Especially, in 2006, the Australian federal 
Department of Health and Ageing commissioned an independent security analysis that 
strongly endorsed digital certificates for e-prescribing. Moreover, in [15] it is 
mentioned that in France and Germany, healthcare smartcards are upgraded with PKI-
capable chips in order to support new healthcare applications that require patients’ 
signatures.   
Finally, MedCom, the national health data network of Denmark, supports a 
nation-wide PKI system in order to provide user authentication, for both citizens and 
professionals. It is achieved using Public Certificates for Electronic Services (OCES 
certificates) issued by the national PKI that can be used in a plethora of national 
public services. Healthcare professionals can use several OCES certificates: a) 
administrative digital signature, b) health professional’s digital signature based on 




3. Open Issues  
 
There are a lot of open issues regarding the efficient adoption of PKI 
technology in large-scale healthcare networks involving many communicating parties. 
First of all, one of the main issues regarding the adoption of PKI technology in such 
networks is the trust model that will be applied. The choice of the appropriate trust 
model is of critical importance for the designing of an efficient inter-organizational 
healthcare PKI infrastructure. Healthcare PKI infrastructure requires the establishment 
of a trust model on which it can rely and be deployed. The decision of the trust model 
is conducted from the trust relationships that exist in the environment in which the 
PKI will be deployed. The trust relationships are based on the organizational (i.e. 
administrative) structure of the healthcare domain. However, there are many trust 
concerns associated with subordination between the participating parties in multi-
domain PKI infrastructures [2, 10, 13]. 
Furthermore, the level of complexity of the certificate path processing in a 
healthcare PKI infrastructure is one more factor that affects the efficient adoption of 
PKI technology in large-scale healthcare networks. Healthcare multi-domain PKI 
infrastructures deployed for large-scale networks consisting of many Certification 
Authorities should keep low complexity of the certificate path processing. Essentially, 
the certificate path processing includes two main processes; path construction and 
path validation. Consequently, path construction including the aggregation of all the 
certificates, which are required to form a complete path from a given target certificate 
to a trust anchor, should be simple. Additionally, path validation should be performed 
directly in order to determine if the public key of the certificate can be trusted or not. 
Especially, path validation is critical in cases of trust extension. However, at the same 
time the determination of the quality of a given certificate is of utmost importance. 
End-entities should be provided with information about the Certification Authority 
(CA) liabilities as well as quality of service parameters of the certificates that the 






4. Design of the Proposed Healthcare PKI Infrastructure 
 
The proposed healthcare PKI is focused to be applied on a large-scale Internet-based 
healthcare network that serves a healthcare domain interconnecting all the healthcare 
professionals registered to the healthcare units located within a defined large-scale 
region.  
We have assumed that the healthcare domain consists of a wide range of 
healthcare units (i.e. healthcare stakeholders) including central hospitals, clinics, 
primary care units, pre-hospital health emergency care units, homecare units and 
pharmacies. Furthermore, we have assumed that the large-scale Internet-based 
healthcare network enables communication and exchange of data among the 
healthcare professionals of the interconnecting healthcare stakeholders. Moreover, we 
have considered that the healthcare domain follows the hierarchical organizational 
structure consisting of three levels of hierarchy.  
In the highest level of organizational hierarchy, there is a governmental 
agency of the Ministry of Health.  The governmental agency is considered as the 
national healthcare authority and all the central hospitals and clinics of the network 
are under its exclusive administrative control.  
The second level of the organizational hierarchy involves the central hospitals 
and the clinics. We have assumed that under the administrative control of each central 
hospital and clinic there is a number of the pre-hospital health emergency care units, 
home healthcare units and pharmacies located close to the corresponding central 
hospital or clinic. Additionally, we have supposed that each central hospital can 
include under its administrative control primary care units which are located close to 
it. Essentially, the central hospitals and clinics play the role of the regional healthcare 
authorities.  
Finally, the third level consists of the end-users of all the healthcare units 
included into the given large-scale healthcare network.  We have assumed that the 
end-users of the included healthcare units are their healthcare professionals. The given 
large-scale healthcare network comprises a wide range of groups of healthcare 
professionals including doctors, nurses, administrative staff, pharmacists, support staff 
and IT staff. Each healthcare professional of the given large-scale healthcare network 
is registered to a central hospital or clinic. Consequently, we consider that the 
registered end-users to each central hospital and clinic are their healthcare 
professionals as well as the healthcare professionals of the primary care units, the 
pharmacies, the pre-hospital health emergency care units and the home healthcare 
units that are under administrative control of each central hospital and clinic.  
 
 
4.1 Proposed PKI Trust Model 
 
Due to the fact that we have assumed that the healthcare domain follows the 
hierarchical organizational structure, we propose a centralized PKI trust model with 
hierarchical CA structure. The proposed PKI trust model follows the traditional 
hierarchical PKI trust model which is based on the establishment of superior-
subordinate CA relationships. It can be represented as an inverted tree with the root at 
the top and the branches extending towards. The elements of the inverted tree are 
nodes and leaves. The nodes represent the CAs and the leaves represent the end 
entities. The root is the node located at the top of the inverted tree and is known as the 
root CA. Below the root CA there are zero or more layers of subordinate CAs. The 
root CA is the starting point for trust. It is the “trust anchor” for the entire trust model 
and issues a self-signed certificate as well as certificates to subordinate CAs that are 
immediately below it but not to the end users. Subordinate CAs, in turn, issue 
certificates to other lower level subordinate CAs or end-entities. The certificates 
issued to CAs are known as CA certificates and the certificates issued to end-entities 
are known as end-entity certificates [12, 13]. 
According to the proposed PKI trust model, each central hospital and clinic 
hosts a regional CA that issues the certificates (i.e. identity certificates and attribute 
certificates) of its registered end-users (i.e. healthcare professionals). In other words, 
the regional CA, which is set up into a central hospital or clinic, issues the certificates 
of the end-users of the corresponding central hospital or clinic as well as the 
certificates of the end-users of the primary care units, the pharmacies, the pre-hospital 
health emergency care units and the home healthcare units that are under its 
administrative control. 
Furthermore, the governmental agency of the Ministry of Health hosts the 
national CA that issues the CA certificates (i.e. identity certificates and attribute 
certificates) of all the CAs which are set up into the central hospitals and clinics 
included into the large-scale healthcare network.  
The proposed hierarchical trust model, in case that it is applied into a 
healthcare domain consisting of N central hospitals and K clinics, is shown into the 
following Figure 1: 
 
 
Figure 1: Proposed Hierarchical Trust Model 
 
The proposed PKI trust model enables the compartmentalization of risk, management 
and certificate processing, since it is based on the traditional hierarchical PKI trust 
model. Thus, it can support the deployment of a more extensible and scalable 
healthcare PKI. Moreover, each CA is able to embody multiple Certificate Policies 
leading to a more efficient PKI infrastructure. Additionally, the proposed PKI trust 
model takes advantages of the hierarchical PKI model’s features regarding path 
construction and path validation processes. Essentially, in the proposed PKI trust 
model, the path construction process presents low complexity since there exists 
always a single path from any end-user of the PKI infrastructure up to the root CA 
(i.e. trust anchor) located within the governmental agency of the Ministry of Health. 
Hence, the proposed PKI trust model has a great advantage in terms of path 
construction process complexity against the Bridge CA model that was first 
introduced by the U.S. Federal Government to facilitate the interconnection of CAs 
through a cross-certification process. Although the Bridge CA model is quite simple 
for the end-user, it is characterized by technical difficulties since the path construction 
is intrinsically complex and several checks must be performed throughout the 
certification chain [13]. In addition, the path validation process of the proposed PKI 
trust model is achieved efficiently, since the hierarchical trust models allow the 
relying party to determine easily if the certificate path is valid [9].  
On the other hand, the main disadvantage of traditional hierarchical PKI trust 
model is the trust issues related to subordination between participating parties. There 
is not a consensus about who is going to manage the root CA and how the responsible 
party is going to do it [13]. However, our proposed model addresses this issue 
introducing the national healthcare authority which is a governmental agency of the 
Ministry of Health and everyone is obliged to follow its decisions and policies. Thus, 
our proposed model is able to address all possible legal and political interoperability 
issues raised due to the wide range of different PKI trust domains included in the 
healthcare network where our proposed model is applied.     
In addition, the proposed PKI model makes use of Trust Lists which are 
published and managed by the governmental agency of the Ministry of Health that 
plays the role of a Trust Provider. The provided Trust Lists allow more efficient 
determination of whether an end-user that makes a request for healthcare services is 
trustworthy as well as qualified sufficiently to be provided with the corresponding 
services according to his/her request. Moreover, the provided Trust Lists are the 
essential mechanisms that enable the interfacing between any healthcare stakeholder 
(e.g. hospital, clinic, pharmacy) participating in the healthcare network and any 
external healthcare organization that is willing to participate in the healthcare 
network. It is achieved due to the fact that the Trust Lists keep information about each 
healthcare organization that leaves or joins the healthcare network. 
 Finally, the proposed PKI model can be implemented using current existing 
technological PKI solutions provided by companies such as VeriSign and OpenTrust. 
The main advantage of the proposed PKI model is that it provides the concept of how 
to design and implement a scalable, flexible and reliable PKI infrastructure for a 
large-scale healthcare network including multi-domain PKI infrastructures. However, 
the current existing technological PKI solutions are generic and can be modified 
efficiently in order to implement a PKI infrastructure that meets the requirements and 
specifications of our proposed PKI model specified in healthcare networks. 
 
 
4.2 Architecture of the Proposed PKI Infrastructure 
 
The proposed PKI Infrastructure consists of a wide spectrum of components including 
identity certificates, attribute certificates, Regional Healthcare Certificate Authorities 





Certificates are the main components of any PKI based infrastructure. In the proposed 
PKI infrastructure, we have supposed the use of two types of certificates; identity 
certificates and attribute certificates. 
Identity certificates are digital documents used to certify the identity of an 
entity. Namely, identity certificates verify that a public key belongs to an identity. 
They bind the identity of an entity to a public key and are digitally signed using the 
private key of the issuing CA. Identity certificates are the vehicle by which public 
keys are distributed over unsecured media such as Internet-based networks [1, 9]. In 
the proposed PKI infrastructure, there are two types of identity certificates; CA 
identity certificates and end-user identity certificates.  
Each end-user identity certificate of the proposed PKI infrastructure 
incorporates a certificate extension, called NHCA Trust List Link that contains the 
URL location of the NHCA Trust List including the reliable CA identity certificates 
of the proposed PKI infrastructure. Additionally, each end-user identity certificate 
incorporates one more certificate extension, called Identity Certification Revocation 
List Link (ICRL Link) that contains the URL location of the Identity Certification 
Revocation List including the serial numbers of the revocated identity certificates of 
the RHCA in which the holder of the end-user identity certificate is registered.     
Attribute certificates, which are also known as authorization certificates, are 
digital documents that do not include the subject’s public keys. Instead, they carry 
authorization information associated with the AC holder. An attribute certificate can 
incorporate attributes (i.e. privileges) that specify access control information (e.g. 
group membership, role) and other authorization information related to the AC holder. 
Furthermore, attribute certificates can enable the support and implementation of a 
critical part of the authorization process.  
In the proposed PKI infrastructure, we have supposed the use of two types of 
attribute certificates; CA attribute certificates and end-user attribute certificates. Both 
of these types are used for controlling access to the large-scale healthcare network 
resources and employing role-based authorization policies. Besides, CA attribute 
certificates include information about the quality of the issued end-user identity 
certificates. 
Each end-user attribute certificate of the proposed PKI infrastructure involves 
a certificate extension, called NHAC Trust List Link that contains the URL location 
of the NHAC Trust List including the CA attribute certificates of the reliable CAs. 
Moreover, each end-user attribute certificate contains a certificate extension, called 
Attribute Certification Revocation List Link (ACRL Link) that contains the URL 
location of the Attribute Certification Revocation List including the serial numbers of 
the revocated attribute certificates of the RHCA in which the holder of the end-user 
attribute certificate is registered.  
The incorporated links in the end-user identity certificate and the end-user 
attribute certificate are shown in the following Figure 2:   
 
 
Figure 2: Incorporated links in the end-user certificates 
 
 
4.2.2 Regional Healthcare Certificate Authorities (RHCAs) 
 
One RHCA is set up in each regional healthcare authority (i.e. central hospitals and 
clinics) included in the large-scale healthcare network. Each RHCA includes three 
main components; the Regional Identity Certificate Authority (RICA), the Regional 
Attribute Certificate Authority (RACA) and Regional Registration Authority (RRA). 
 
Regional Identity Certificate Authority (RICA): Each RICA is configured to issue, 
renew and revoke identity certificates for the end-users registered to it. Each RICA 
issues end-user identity certificates to the end-users who are able to prove their 
identity. Namely, the RICAs of the large-scale healthcare network issue doctor 
identity certificates, nurse identity certificates, administrative staff identity 
certificates, support staff identity certificates and IT staff identity certificates. 
Moreover, the RICAs issue the identity certificates of the end-users of the pre-hospital 
health emergency care units, home healthcare units and pharmacies.  Finally, only the 
RICAs of the central hospitals issue also the identity certificates of the end-users of 
their primary care units. All the issued end-user identity certificates of each RICA are 
distributed to the eligible end-users. Essentially, the RICA of each central hospital or 
clinic plays the role of the root CA for the end-users registered to the corresponding 
central hospital or clinic.   
Furthermore, each RICA is responsible to inform the end-users when end-user 
identity certificates issued by it are no longer valid. For instance, an end-user identity 
certificate may become invalid before the normal expiration of its validity period in 
case that the end-user changed his personal information or the private key associated 
with the certificate is compromised. Under such circumstances, the RICA revokes the 
identity certificate by listing its serial number on a list, called Identity Certification 
Revocation List (ICRL). An end-user is allowed to have access to the ICRL of any 
RICA using the ICRL Link embodied in each end-user identity certificate.  
 
Regional Attribute Certificate Authority (RACA): The RACA issues end-user 
attribute certificates for the end-users registered to it based on their specific 
requirements and needs. In other words, RACAs play a significant role to control the 
access to the stored information, the role of the accessing end-user and the type of 
information use.  Each end-user attribute certificate contains authorized end-user’s 
attributes and binds them to the end-user identity certificate. An end-user attribute 
certificate verifies that the holder possesses a value for a given attribute (e.g. 
qualifications, permissions, authorities granted) in order the holder to obtain the 
required healthcare services. Consequently, in the proposed PKI infrastructure, due to 
the attribute certificates each end-user is assigned a set of specific rights that governs 
the permissions required to accomplish his/her tasks. Furthermore, each end-user can 
possess different attribute certificates associated with different purposes of use in 
different situations. The issued end-user attribute certificates of each RACA are 
distributed to the eligible end-users. Additionally, in the proposed PKI infrastructure, 
each RACA is responsible to verify the validity of the end-user attribute certificates 
and revokes attribute certificates in case that they are no longer valid, compromised or 
lost. The end-user attribute certificate validity period is based on the validity period of 
the end-user identity certificate. Each RACA revokes the end-user attribute 
certificates by listing their serial number on a list, called Attribute Certification 
Revocation List (ACRL). An end-user is allowed to have access to the ACRL of any 
RACA using the ACRL Link embodied in each end-user attribute certificate. 
 
Regional Registration Authority (RRA): Finally, each Regional Registration 
Authority (RRA) is responsible for gathering certificate requests from the potential 
end-users of the corresponding central hospital or clinic and checking their credentials 
in order to verify identity of the applicant. 
 
 
4.2.3 National Healthcare Certificate Authority (NHCA) 
 
The NHCA is set up in the governmental agency of the Ministry of Health and 
consists of the following three national main components; the National Identity 
Certificate Authority (NICA), the National Attribute Certificate Authority (NACA) 
and the National Registration Authority (NRA). 
  
National Identity Certificate Authority (NICA): The NICA is responsible for 
issuing, renewing and revoking CA identity certificates in accordance with one or 
more Certificate Policies. The NICA issues CA identity certificates only to RHCA set 
up into the regional healthcare authorities (i.e. central hospitals and clinics) involved 
into the large-scale healthcare network and can prove their identity and credentials. In 
other words, the NICA plays the role of the root CA for the RHCA of the large-scale 
healthcare network.  
 
National Attribute Certificate Authority (NACA): The NACA is responsible for 
issuing CA attribute certificates for the RHCA. The CA attribute certificates 
incorporate qualifying information (i.e. service parameters) associated with the 
services that the corresponding certificate holder (i.e. central hospitals, clinics) can 
provide to each end-user. 
 
National Registration Authority (NRA): The National Registration Authority 
(NRA) is responsible for gathering certificate requests from the RHCA and checking 
their identity in order to implement the function of registration. Furthermore, the NRA 
enhances the over scalability of the proposed PKI infrastructure. 
 
 
4.2.4 Trust Lists 
 
In our proposed PKI infrastructure, the NHCA plays also the role of a Trust Provider 
and is responsible to publish and manage two types of lists; the National Healthcare 
CA Trust List (NHCA Trust List) and the National Healthcare Attribute Certificate 
Trust List (NHAC Trust List).   
 
National Healthcare CA Trust List (NHCA Trust List): The NHCA Trust List is a 
signed list, including the trusted CA identity certificates of the legal and reliable 
current RHCA of the PKI infrastructure. Moreover, the NHCA Trust List comprises 
information that validates the integrity and authenticity of the data included in it. 
Additionally, the NHCA Trust List is updated every time that a RHCA leaves the PKI 
infrastructure or a new RHCA joins the PKI infrastructure. Namely, the NHCA Trust 
List is updated every time that a central hospital or clinic leaves or joins the large-
scale healthcare network. Consequently, the NHCA Trust List allows access to the 
reliable CA identity certificates of the current reliable RHCA at any time that an end-
user is involved in an electronic transaction and needs to validate if the issuer of an 
end-user identity certificate is currently a legal entity. The end-user is allowed to have 
access to the NHCA Trust List using the NHCA Trust List Link embodied in each 
end-user identity certificate.  
 
National Healthcare Attribute Certificate Trust List (NHAC Trust List): The 
NHAC Trust List is a signed list, including the CA attribute certificates of the 
RHCAs. Similar to the NHCA Trust List, the NHAC Trust List includes also 
additional information that validates the integrity and authenticity of the stored 
Attribute Certificates. The major importance of the CA attribute certificate derives 
from the fact that the relying party is able to interpret the incorporated service 
parameters of the CA attribute certificate and decide if the issuer is qualified for a 
given specific purpose. The NHAC Trust List is updated based on the NHCA Trust 
list. In other words, in case that a CA identity certificate is added/removed in/from the 
NHCA Trust list, the corresponding CA attribute certificate is automatically 
added/removed in/from the NHAC Trust List. Finally, the end-user can access the 
NHAC Trust List using the NHAC Trust List Link embodied in each end-user 
attribute certificate.  
5. Certificate Evaluation Process 
 
In the proposed PKI infrastructure, the certificate evaluation process consists of a 
number of steps in order to define whether the end-user, who makes a request, is 
trustworthy as well as qualified sufficiently to be provided the corresponding services 
according to his/her request. To present the certificate evaluation process, we assume 
the case that an end-user (i.e. identity certificate holder) of a central hospital intends 
to get involved in an electronic transaction with another end-user (i.e. the relying 
party) of a clinic. The required steps of the proposed PKI infrastructure are shown in 
the following Figure 3: 
 
 
Figure 3: Certificate Evaluation Process 
 
Step 1: First of all, the identity certificate holder should send his/her identity 
certificate to the relying party. 
  
Step 2: Upon receiving the end-user identity certificate of the identity certificate 
holder, the relying party needs to validate if the given identity certificate is not 
revocated. Thus, the relying party makes use of the ICRL Link incorporated into the 
received identity certificate and points to the ICRL including the serial numbers of the 
revocated identity certificates of the RHCA in which the holder of the end-user 
identity certificate is registered. In case that the serial number of the received identity 
certificate is stored in this list then the process is stopped. Otherwise, the relying party 
should validate if the issuer (i.e. the corresponding RHCA) of the end-user identity 
certificate is currently a legal and reliable authority that he/she can trust. This 
validation should take place in Step 3, before the appropriate procedures for path 
construction and path validation take place.  
 
Step 3: The relying party makes use of the NHCA Trust List Link included in the 
received identity certificate and points to the NHCA Trust List including all the 
current valid CA identity certificates of all the RHCAs included into the large-scale 
healthcare network in order to check whether the RHCA issued the end-user identity 
certificate is still valid and can be trustworthy. In case that the CA identity certificate 
of the RHCA is not included in the NHCA Trust List, then the RHCA is considered 
untrustful and the process is stopped. Otherwise, in case that the CA identity 
certificate of the RHCA is included in the NHCA Trust List, then the RHCA is 
considered trustworthy and the path construction and path validation processes can 
take place in order to examine the validity of each certificate of the path. In case that 
any concern is raised regarding the validity of one or more certificates of the path then 
the process is stopped. In different circumstances, the identity certificate holder is 
considered as trustworthy and the procedure is continued in Step 4. in order the 
relying party to define whether the holder is qualified to be provided the services that 
he/she request. 
 
Step 4: The relying party should request the attribute certificate of the identity 
certificate holder in order to be able to decide whether the identity certificate holder is 
qualified efficiently and has the rights to be provided with the requested services. 
Additionally, the relying party should request the attribute certificate of the identity 
certificate holder in order to be able to decide whether the relying party can provide 
the appropriate services to the holder of the identity certificate in case that the holder 
is qualified sufficiently. Regarding the first decision, the CA attribute certificate of the 
RHCA, in which the holder is registered, should be checked. Furthermore, the second 
decision is based on the matching of the relying party’s attribute certificate and the 
attribute certificate of the identity certificate holder. 
 
Step 5: The identity certificate holder should send his/her attribute certificate to the 
relying party. 
 
Step 6: Firstly, the relying party should validate if the received attribute certificate is 
not revocated. Thus, the relying party makes use of the ACRL Link incorporated into 
the received attribute certificate and points to the ACRL including the serial numbers 
of the revocated attribute certificates of the RHCA in which the holder of the attribute 
certificate is registered. In case that the serial number of the given attribute certificate 
is stored in this list then the process is stopped. Otherwise, the process is continued in 
Step 7. 
 
Step 7: The relying party should decide whether the identity certificate holder has the 
rights to be provided with the requested services. Hence, the relying party uses the 
NHAC Trust List Link included in the received attribute certificate and points to the 
NHAC Trust List involving the CA attribute certificates of all the reliable RHCAs 
included into the large-scale healthcare network in order to access the corresponding 
CA attribute certificate of the given RHCA and check if the holder has the appropriate 
rights. In case that there is no concern regarding the rights of the holder, then the 
matching process of the relying party’s attribute certificate and the attribute certificate 
of the identity certificate holder should take place in order to decide whether the 






In this paper, we have proposed a PKI infrastructure to provide secure communication 
services and exchange of data among healthcare professionals over a large-scale 
Internet-based healthcare network connecting a wide range of healthcare units 
dispersed over a wide area. The proposed PKI infrastructure aims at addressing the 
raised issues related to the deployment of PKI infrastructures over large-scale 
healthcare networks. It adopts the traditional hierarchical PKI trust model in order to 
enable the compartmentalization of risk, management and certificate processing. 
Furthermore, it facilitates the trust issues raised in a large-scale healthcare network 
including multi-domain PKI infrastructures. Moreover, in the proposed PKI 
infrastructure, the certificate processing is characterized by low complexity. 
Additionally, our PKI infrastructure suggests the use of Trust Lists in order to provide 
a mechanism that allows more efficient determination of whether an end-user that 
makes a request for healthcare services is trustworthy as well as qualified sufficiently 
to be provided with the corresponding services according to his/her request. 
Moreover, at the same time the proposed infrastructure intends to provide scalability, 
flexibility and reduced administration costs, especially when the number of 
participating healthcare professionals increases. 
Our PKI infrastructure can be also used to support secure healthcare services 
not only for healthcare professionals but also for patients registered to central 
hospitals or clinics of a large-scale healthcare network. Patients can be one more 
group of end-users served by the healthcare network. However, a challenging task is 
going to be the distribution and storage of the identity and attribute certificates of the 
patients. A possible solution can be the use of smart cards. Despite the fact that this 
solution can be feasible for the distribution and storage of the healthcare 
professionals’ certificates, it is impractical for the distribution and storage of patients’ 
certificates because of its cost. This solution is not cost effective since each patient 
should have a smart card including his/her identity and attribute certificates as well as 
a smart card reader in case that he/she wants to implement a healthcare transaction 
from his/her own home. Hence, the secure distribution and storage of the identity and 
attribute certificates of the patients of a large-scale healthcare domain should take 
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